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Suppose that a state is sued in its own courts under a provi-
sion of federal law. The state, believing that its chances of victory
are better in a federal forum, removes the case to federal court.'
Unfortunately for the state, it made the wrong choice. After the
state loses in federal court, the state appeals. Among its argu-
ments, the state adds a new defense: Eleventh Amendment im-
munity.
The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that a state may
raise Eleventh Amendment immunity for the first time on ap-
peal.2 Recently, Justice Kennedy characterized the Court's ap-
proval of belated assertions of Eleventh Amendment immunity as
"allow[ing] States to proceed to judgment without facing any real
risk of adverse consequences."3 Because a state may litigate the
merits of a case without forfeiting its Eleventh Amendment im-
munity, it can await a federal court's decision before deciding
t B.A. 1994, Georgetown University; J.D. Candidate 2000, The University of Chicago.
Removal provides defendants with an opportunity to invoke federal jurisdiction even
if a plaintiff originally files the suit in state court. The basic removal provision, 28 USC
§ 1441(a) (1994), provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in
a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdic-
tion, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending.
Generally, a defendant can remove actions over which the federal district courts
have original jurisdiction. There are two main categories of original jurisdiction. The first
category, federal question jurisdiction, includes cases "arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 USC § 1331 (1994). The second category, diver-
sity jurisdiction, includes cases in which the matter in controversy is greater than $75,000
and the controversy is between citizens of different states. 28 USCA § 1332(a) (1993 &
Supp 1998). But see Mitchell N. Berman, Note, Removal and the Eleventh Amendment.
The Case for District Court Remand Discretion to Avoid a Bifurcated Suit, 92 Mich L Rev
683, 695-96 (1993) (arguing that federal diversity jurisdiction cannot lie over a case to
which a state is a party).
' See, for example, Pennhurst State School and Hospital v Halderman, 465 US 89, 99
n 8 (1984); Edelman v Jordan, 415 US 651, 677-78 (1974); Ford Motor Co v Department of
Treasury of Indiana, 323 US 459, 466-67 (1945).
' Wisconsin Department of Corrections v Schacht, 118 S Ct 2047, 2055 (1998) (Ken-
nedy concurring).
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whether to object to the court's jurisdiction. If the decision is un-
favorable to the state, the state can appeal, assert Eleventh
Amendment immunity, and have the judgment vacated on the
ground that the federal court lacked jurisdiction over the state.
On the other hand, if the state prevails, it can take advantage of
the claim preclusive effect of its victory. By permitting assertions
of Eleventh Amendment immunity for the first time on appeal,
the Supreme Court has conferred upon states "an unfair advan-
tage,"4 enabling states to use Eleventh Amendment immunity as
both a sword and a shield.
The Eleventh Amendment clearly protects states from suit in
federal court. But when a state defendant removes a case to fed-
eral court only to contend that no relief can be granted, Eleventh
Amendment immunity is transformed into a sword.5 This Com-
ment examines Justice Kennedy's proposed solution to this prob-
lem of strategic behavior by states, which is to construe a state's
removal of a case to federal court as a waiver of its Eleventh
Amendment immunity. After concluding that Justice Kennedy's
proposal would afford inadequate protection to state sovereign
immunity, the Comment argues that the strategic behavior
problem should instead be solved by a rule requiring federal dis-
trict courts to consider sovereign immunity sua sponte in any
case that appears to present the issue.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief introduction to the
Eleventh Amendment, explaining how, in most cases, the Su-
preme Court has appropriately safeguarded state sovereignty
while balancing it against the need for state accountability. Part
II explains that to the extent current law enables states to use
the Eleventh Amendment as a tool of strategic litigation, it un-
dermines state accountability without any corresponding benefit.
Permitting belated assertions of Eleventh Amendment immunity
forces appellate courts to vacate judgments at a late stage of liti-
gation, rendering federal district court decisions moot and
Id.
In Gorka v Sullivan, 82 F3d 772 (7th Cir 1996), the Seventh Circuit characterized
such legal maneuvering by a state defendant as permitting the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity to "operate as a sword as well as a shield." Id at 773. In Gorka, Medicaid recipients
brought a suit alleging both federal and state law claims against Indiana officials after
Indiana announced plans to reduce reimbursement rates for transportation services. After
the defendants removed the case to federal court, the plaintiffs filed a motion to remand
the suit to state court, arguing that complete relief would be barred because of the defen-
dants' assertion of sovereign immunity. The district court retained jurisdiction over the
entire suit, ruled against the plaintiffs on the merits of the federal law claims, and re-
manded the state law claims. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated the district courts
decision and ordered the entire case remanded to state court, holding that the Eleventh
Amendment barred federal court jurisdiction over the state. Id at 774-75.
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thereby diminishing state accountability in federal courts. Part
III concludes that requiring federal courts to raise Eleventh
Amendment immunity sua sponte would largely eliminate the
unfair advantage that states currently have because federal
courts would only hear cases against states if they have waived
their immunity.6 Because the sua sponte rule would safeguard
state sovereign immunity while providing private plaintiffs with
a proper forum in which to litigate the merits of a case, this solu-
tion would better balance the values of state sovereignty and
state accountability than Justice Kennedy's proposed solution.
I. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State."' The Supreme Court often characterizes the
Eleventh Amendment as a constitutional affirmation of the broad
principle of state sovereign immunity.8 Accordingly, the Court in-
terprets it as a blanket restriction on suits against unconsenting
states in federal court. Moreover, the Court routinely invokes the
Eleventh Amendment to safeguard the values of federalism,' as-
6 Similarly, federal courts would hear suits against state defendants if Congress ab-
rogated state sovereign immunity pursuant to Congress's enforcement power under Sec-
tion Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Part I.B.
US Const, Amend XI.
See, for example, Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 517 US 44, 54 (1996); Welch v
Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation, 483 US 468, 486 (1987) (noting
that the Supreme Court has "firmly established that the Eleventh Amendment embodies a
broad constitutional principle of sovereign immunity"). It is important to note, however,
that many scholars disagree with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment as an affirmation of states' sovereign immunity from suit in federal court.
See, for example, Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and
State Sovereign Immunity, 98 Yale L J 1, 44-49 (1988) (concluding that the Eleventh
Amendment does not supply constitutional immunity for states as to claims arising under
federal law); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 Colum L Rev 1889, 2004 (1983) (concluding that the Eleventh
Amendment limits only the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, thus permitting
federal court jurisdiction over suits against states arising under federal law). See also
Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 110 (Souter dissenting) (arguing that "[t]he history and struc-
ture of the Eleventh Amendment convincingly show that it reaches only to suits subject to
federal jurisdiction exclusively under the Citizen-State Diversity Clauses").
Federalism not only safeguards state sovereignty but also ensures political account-
ability through local participation in government, permits governmental experimentation
with the states serving as "laboratories," and protects individuals against an omnipotent
federal government. See John R. D'Angelo, Note, Reconciling Federalism and Individual
Rights: The Burger Court's Treatment of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 68 Va
L Rev 865, 865-66 n 4 (1982). The Eleventh Amendment serves some of the values of fed-
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serting that "the doctrine of sovereign immunity plays a vital role
in our federal system."" However, scholars have criticized the
Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence for failing to protect
the competing values of federalism equally. In particular, the
Court's construction of the Eleventh Amendment has been criti-
cized for excessively favoring state sovereignty at the expense of
state accountability. 1 This Part argues that although Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence protects state sovereignty more than
it ensures state accountability, the Supreme Court's attempts to
reconcile these competing interests nevertheless comport with the
balance contemplated by the Framers.
A. The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereignty
The passage of the Eleventh Amendment marked the first
successful attempt to overrule a Supreme Court decision by con-
stitutional amendment. In Chisholm v Georgia,2 the Supreme
Court upheld federal jurisdiction over an action initiated by a
South Carolina resident to recover money owed by the State of
Georgia. Georgia argued that sovereign immunity protected it
from suit in federal court despite the fact that Article III explic-
itly extends federal judicial power to "controversies... between a
State and Citizens of another State.""s The Supreme Court ad-
hered to the plain language of Article III and denied Georgia sov-
ereign immunity from suit in federal court. The Chisholm deci-
sion "created such a shock of surprise throughout the country
that, at the first meeting of Congress thereafter, the Eleventh
Amendment .. .was almost unanimously proposed, and was in
due course adopted by the legislatures of the States." 4 In light of
the history surrounding the ratification of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, the Supreme Court has since "understood the Eleventh
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the
presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms:
that the States entered the federal system with their sovereignty
intact; that the judicial authority in Article III is limited by this
sovereignty; and that a State will therefore not be subject to suit
in federal court unless it has consented to suit, either expressly or
in the 'plan of the convention.""' 5
eralism by recognizing state immunity and by protecting a state's treasury. Id.
Welch, 483 US at 486-87.
" See note 66.
,2 2 US (2 Dall) 419 (1793).
Id at 431, citing US Const, Art III, § 2, cl 1.
1, Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1, 11 (1890).
Blatchford v Native Village of Noatak, 501 US 775, 779 (1991) (citations omitted).
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In an effort to safeguard states' sovereignty, the Supreme
Court has characterized the Eleventh Amendment as a reasser-
tion of the immunity from suit held by states at common law.
6
The states originally enjoyed sovereign immunity from all suits,
whether initiated by their own citizens, by citizens of another
state, or by citizens of a foreign country. 7 At common law, "[t]he
suability of a State without its consent was a thing unknown to
the law,"'8 and thus, "the fundamental principle of sovereign im-
munity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III.""9 The
Supreme Court has applied this characterization of the Eleventh
Amendment expansively to guard state sovereignty and to limit
the reach of federal jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
demonstrates a strong commitment to the principle of state sov-
ereignty. In Hans v Louisiana,"0 the Supreme Court held that
states were immune from suits initiated by their own citizens,2
even though the text of the Eleventh Amendment merely prohib-
its suits against a state "by Citizens of another State, or by Citi-
zens or Subjects of any Foreign State."22 The Court held that it
would be "anomalous" to interpret the Constitution as guarding
states' sovereign immunity from suits by citizens of another state
while allowing suits against a state by its own citizens.23 It there-
fore held that sovereign immunity was protected by an implicit
limitation on the federal judicial power under Article III. Simi-
larly, in Ex parte New York,24 the Supreme Court extended Elev-
enth Amendment immunity to insulate states from admiralty
The phrase "in the plan of the convention" refers to the notion that in ratifying the Consti-
tution, each of the states may have given up some sovereignty as a condition of entering
the Union.
" See Hans, 134 US at 15-16. See also Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 54 (affirming that
"each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system ... [and] [i]t is inherent in the na-
ture of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent")
(internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases). Nevertheless, a great deal of aca-
demic scholarship questions whether governments were immune from suit in court at
common law. See, for example, Gibbons, 83 Colum L Rev at 1913-14 (cited in note 8) (con-
cluding that "the evidence upon which the [Supreme] Court has relied in justification for
the position that the eleventh amendment restored the original understanding about state
sovereign immunity is insufficient to support that position").
'" Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 7.3 at 378 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1994).
" Hans, 134 US at 16.
" Pennhurst State School and Hospital v Halderman, 465 US 89, 98 (1984). See also
Welch, 483 US at 472; Atascadero State Hospital v Scanlon, 473 US 234, 238 (1985), both
quoting Pennhurst, 465 US at 98.
134 US 1 (1890).
21 Id at 20.
US Const, Amend XI.
Hans, 134 US at 10-11.
256 US 490 (1921).
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suits25 even though the Amendment by its terms applies only to
suits "in law or equity."26 Finally, in Principality of Monaco v Mis-
sissippi," the Court relied on the sovereignty principle to hold
that the Eleventh Amendment barred federal court jurisdiction
over suits initiated by foreign nations against a state28 despite the
fact that the terms of the Eleventh Amendment merely prohibit
suits by "Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. '29 As these de-
cisions demonstrate, the Court often invokes the sovereignty
principle to move beyond the literal terms of the Eleventh
Amendment in order to insulate the states from federal jurisdic-
tion.
The sovereignty principle not only facilitates an expansive
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, but also affords
states certain rights as litigants. Most importantly, the Supreme
Court has recognized that the principle of sovereign immunity
permits states to waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity
and consent to suit in federal court, for "[1like any sovereignty, a
State may voluntarily consent to be sued."" To effectuate a valid
waiver of immunity the Supreme Court requires "an unequivocal
indication that the State intends to consent to federal jurisdiction
that otherwise would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment.""'
In most cases, the alleged waiver of immunity is found insuffi-
cient to constitute consent to suit in federal court. For example,
the Supreme Court has held that, absent an explicit legislative
grant of authority, a state's attorney general may not waive the
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.32 Additionally, the Su-
preme Court has held that "[t]he mere fact that a State partici-
pates in a program through which the Federal Government pro-
vides assistance for the operation by the State of a system of
public aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the
2 Id at 497-98.
US Const, Amend XI. The Supreme Court has held that Article HI establishes suits
in admiralty as a class of cases distinct from suits in law and equity. See Romero v Inter-
national Terminal Operating Co, 358 US 354, 364-67 (1959); The American Insurance Co v
Canter, 26 US (1 Pet) 511, 544-45 (1828).
292 US 313 (1934).
Id at 322-29.
US Const, Amend XI.
Ashton v Cameron County Water Improvement District, 298 US 513, 531 (1936). See
also Welch, 483 US at 473 ('If a State waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal
court, the suit is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment."); Gunter v Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad Co, 200 US 273, 284 (1906) ("Although a state may not be sued without its con-
sent, such immunity is a privilege which may be waived."); Clark v Barnard, 108 US 436,
447 (1883) (stating that Eleventh Amendment immunity "is a personal privilege which [a
state] may waive at pleasure").
" Atascadero, 473 US at 238 n 1.
Ford Motor Co v Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 US 459, 468 (1945).
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State to be sued in the federal courts."33 A state does not waive its
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court merely
by waiving immunity from suit in its own state courts34 or
through a state statute authorizing the state to be sued "in any
court of competent jurisdiction."35 The Court's reluctance to find
valid waiver demonstrates its commitment to safeguarding state
sovereign immunity as embodied in the Eleventh Amendment,36
for "[c]onstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated
with the surrender of constitutional rights."37
B. The Eleventh Amendment and State Accountability
The principle of sovereign immunity is in tension with the
principle that the law generally will provide a remedy for rights
violated by a state.38 Furthermore, construing the Eleventh
Amendment as a broad prohibition on suits against states in fed-
eral court divests the courts of an important mechanism by which
to ensure state compliance with federal laws. Consequently, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that states' Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity is not absolute.
The Supreme Court began to restrict the application of the
Eleventh Amendment by allowing plaintiffs to sue state officers.
In Ex parte Young,39 the Court held that a state officer executing
an unconstitutional law was to be regarded as acting ultra vires.A
Accordingly, relief against the officer named as defendant was
not to be considered relief against the state and thus was not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.41 Similarly, in Fitzpatrick v
Bitzer,42 the Court held that Congress may use its enforcement
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate states'
' Edelman v Jordan, 415 US 651, 673 (1974). See also Atascadero, 473 US at 246-47
(holding that "the mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a State has con-
sented to suit in federal court").
Pennhurst, 465 US at 99 n 9. Accord Welch, 483 US at 473-74.
Kennecott Copper Corp v State Tax Commission, 327 US 573, 578 (1946).
Scholars often contest the view of the Eleventh Amendment as an embodiment of
sovereign immunity. See note 8. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court interprets the Eleventh
Amendment as an affirmation of sovereign immunity.
'7Edelman, 415 US at 673.
See Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803) (The very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury.").
209 US 123 (1908).
Id at 159-60.
Id at 157-60.
427 US 445 (1976).
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Eleventh Amendment immunity and permit suits for damages
against states.43
Although the Court has made some efforts to restrict the
scope of the Eleventh Amendment, it interprets these exceptions
narrowly. For example, in Edelman v Jordan," the Court limited
the availability of relief in Ex parte Young actions to prospective
relief, such as an injunction.45 Retroactive relief, such as a mone-
tary award for past wrongdoing, is barred because payment
would come from the state treasury." Similarly, in Atascadero
State Hospital v Scanlon,47 the Court limited the scope of the con-
gressional abrogation doctrine, holding that "Congress may abro-
gate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in
federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in
the language of the statute."' The Court reasoned that this clear
statement rule was necessary to ensure that federal courts did
not subject states to suits when Congress did not intend for the
states' immunity to be abrogated.49 Several years later, in Dell-
muth v Muth," the Court demonstrated the restrictive nature of
the clear statement rule by noting that "evidence of congressional
intent must be both unequivocal and textual.... Legislative his-
tory generally will be irrelevant."51
The Court further limited the congressional abrogation doc-
trine in Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida.52 Just seven years af-
ter the Court had ruled in Pennsylvania v Union Gas Co53 that
Congress may override the Eleventh Amendment when it acts
pursuant to any Article I power,' the Court reversed itself. In
Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court limited Congress's power to
abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity to laws enacted
pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 The
Court reasoned, "The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial
power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circum-
Id at 456.
,415 US 651 (1974).
Id at 664-65.
46 Id.
47 473 US 234 (1985).
' Id at 242.
41 Id at 242-43.
-491 US 223 (1989).
SId at 230.
517 US 44 (1996).
491 US 1 (1989).
Id at 23 (holding that Congress may abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity when it acts pursuant to the Commerce Clause power so long as the federal statute
abrogating immunity expressly authorizes suits against states in federal court).
517 US at 59-73.
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vent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdic-
tion."56 Because of the strength with which the Court reaffirmed
the principle that the Eleventh Amendment serves as a bar to
federal jurisdiction, the decision in Seminole Tribe is a notewor-
thy limit on the ability to hold state governments accountable in
federal court.
C. The Balance Struck by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
undoubtedly demonstrates a greater commitment to protecting
state sovereign immunity than to ensuring state accountability in
federal court.57 This commitment seems consistent with the intent
of the Framers of the Eleventh Amendment who, by phrasing the
Amendment in such broad and absolute terms, evinced their in-
tent that sovereignty ought to be paramount over accountability.
Eleventh Amendment doctrine has developed on the premise,
based on the history of the Amendment's ratification, that the
states entered the Union "with their sovereignty intact."' Ac-
cordingly, states' sovereignty limits the reach of federal judicial
power such that private plaintiffs cannot sue a state in federal
court unless the state has consented-either explicitly or "in the
plan of the convention."" In this manner, the Eleventh Amend-
ment is said to reinstate the general view held before Chisholm-
that a state could not be sued without its consent."
Moreover, employing the Eleventh Amendment to safeguard
state sovereignty may be justified given the absence of other con-
stitutional provisions that explicitly preserve the federal system.
As the Supreme Court has noted:
[O]ur Eleventh Amendment doctrine is necessary to support
the view of the federal system held by the Framers of the
Constitution. The Framers believed that the States played a
vital role in our system and that strong state governments
Id at 72-73.
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism and Functionalism in Federalism Analysis, 13
Ga St U L Rev 959, 983 (1997). See also Jackson, 98 Yale L J at 72-104 (cited in note 8).
" Blatchford, 501 US at 779-82 (finding "no compelling evidence that the Founders
thought such a surrender [of sovereignty] inherent in the constitutional compact").
Monaco, 292 US at 323, quoting Federalist 81 (Hamilton).
See Hans, 134 US at 15-16 ('The truth is, that the cognizance of suits and actions
unknown to the law, and forbidden by the law, was not contemplated by the Constitution
when establishing the judicial power of the United States.... The suability of a State
without its consent was a thing unknown to the law."). See also Charles Warren, 1 The
Supreme Court in United States History 91-96 (Little, Brown 1923) (presenting contempo-
rary views that states enjoyed common law immunity prior to the Supreme Courts deci-
sion in Chisholm).
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were essential to serve as a "counterpoise" to the power of
the Federal Government.'
The fundamental principles of federalism thus compel the Court
to protect state sovereignty. Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
appropriately reflects this goal.
As a safeguard of state sovereignty, the Eleventh Amend-
ment most directly serves to prevent the subjugation of state gov-
ernments by the federal government. Empowering a federal court
to pass judgment on an unconsenting state is an affront to the
dignity of the state as a sovereign and a threat to the state's
treasury. As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, "The Elev-
enth Amendment does not exist solely in order to 'preven[t] fed-
eral-court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury';
it also serves to avoid 'the indignity of subjecting a State to the
coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private
parties.' 62 Thus, to bind unwilling states to the judgments of fed-
eral courts would aggrandize the power of the federal government
at the expense of state governments.
The ratification of the Constitution largely depended upon
the Framers' ability to dispel the fear that the Constitution would
empower "the Federal Judiciary to summon a State as defendant
and to adjudicate its rights and liabilities."" To this end, Alexan-
der Hamilton wrote:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amena-
ble to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the
general sense and the general practice of mankind; and the
exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now
enjoyed by the government of every state in the union.... To
what purpose would it be to authorise suits against states,
for the debts they owe? How could recoveries be enforced? It
is evident that it could not be done without waging war
against the contracting state; and to ascribe to the federal
courts, by mere implication, and in destruction of a pre-
existing right of the state governments, a power which would
Atascadero, 473 US at 238 n 2, citing Federalist 17 (Hamilton), in Jacob E. Cooke,
ed, The Federalist 105, 107-08 (Wesleyan 1961), and Federalist 46 (Madison), in Cooke, ed,
The Federalist 315, 316-17.
Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 58, citing Hess v Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp, 513
US 30, 48 (1994), and Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v Metcalf & Eddy, Inc,
506 US 139, 146 (1993) (citations omitted).
Warren, 1 The Supreme Court in United States History at 91 (cited in note 60).
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involve such a consequence, would be altogether forced and
unwarrantable.64
The Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence appro-
priately reflects the problems "inherent in making one sovereign
appear against its will in the courts of the other."" Thus, the
Court's jurisprudence manifests an acute awareness of the essen-
tial role that the Eleventh Amendment plays in the preservation
of our federal system.
Because the Supreme Court's jurisprudence so carefully
guards state sovereignty, it has been criticized for failing to en-
sure state compliance with federal laws." To some extent, the
Court's ostensible disregard for the value of state accountability
may reflect its awareness of other mechanisms that adequately
ensure state compliance with federal laws. For example, the
Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit the Federal Government
itself from suing states in federal court in order to enforce sub-
stantive federal laws. 7 Similarly, the Eleventh Amendment does
not bar state courts from adjudicating some claims against states
that arise under federal law.68 Nor does the Eleventh Amendment
"Federalist 81 (Hamilton), in Cooke, ed, The Federalist 541, 548-49 (cited in note 61).
Employees v Department of Public Health and Welfare of Missouri, 411 US 279, 294
(1973). See also Welch, 483 US at 486.
"Generally, these scholars argue that the Eleventh Amendment was enacted to pro-
tect states from diversity suits only, leaving federal courts' jurisdiction over cases arising
under federal or constitutional law untouched. According to the "diversity theory," the
Eleventh Amendment was adopted solely to overrule Chisholm v Georgia, 2 US (2 Dall)
419, in which the Supreme Court upheld federal diversity jurisdiction over an action initi-
ated by a South Carolina resident to recover money owed by the State of Georgia. Accord-
ingly, because Chisholm only involved a controversy "between a State and Citizens of an-
other State," US Const, Art III, § 2, cl 1, the Eleventh Amendment only provides state
sovereign immunity in suits based on diversity of citizenship. See James E. Pfander, His-
tory and State Suability: An "Explanatory"Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 Cornell
L Rev 1269, 1323-52 (1998); Jackson, 98 Yale L J at 3-13, 44-51 (cited in note 8); Akhil
Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L J 1425, 1473-92 (1987); Gibbons, 83
Colum L Rev at 1934-38 (cited in note 8). Scholars endorsing the diversity theory argue
that because of the Supreme Court's misinterpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, the
Courfs jurisprudence fails both to ensure state compliance with federal laws and to hold
state governments accountable through actions in federal court. See, for example, Chem-
erinsky, 13 Ga St U L Rev at 968-69 (cited in note 57); Jackson, 98 Yale L J at 3 (cited in
note 8).
Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 71 n 14.
The Supreme Court has affirmed the adequacy of state courts as tribunals for the
adjudication of cases arising under federal laws. See Idaho v Coeur dAlene Tribe of Idaho,
117 S Ct 2028, 2037 (1997) ("It would be error coupled with irony were we to bypass the
Eleventh Amendment, which enacts a scheme solicitous of the States, on the sole rationale
that state courts are inadequate to enforce and interpret federal rights in every case.");
Atascadero, 473 US at 238 n 2 ("It denigrates the judges who serve on the state courts to
suggest that they will not enforce the supreme law of the land."). See also Employees, 411
US at 298 (Marshall concurring) (noting that "since federal law stands as the supreme law
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prohibit suits against state officials for violations of federal law.69
Finally, the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent the Supreme
Court from reviewing state court decisions involving claims
against the states."
Furthermore, as the Constitution does not mandate the es-
tablishment of lower federal courts at all, the assertion that state
compliance with federal laws depends upon the availability of a
federal forum in which to adjudicate the merits of a case is un-
tenable.71 Thus, "[t]he issue [concerning the Eleventh Amend-
ment] is not the general immunity of the States from private
suit-a question of the common law-but merely the susceptibil-
ity of the States to suit before federal tribunals."72
II. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AS A SWORD
To the extent that the Eleventh Amendment shields state
sovereign immunity, it serves the goal of protecting the vital role
of the states in our federal system. However, a largely unexplored
wrinkle in the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurispru-
dence currently permits states to use the Amendment as both a
sword and a shield under certain circumstances. Justice Ken-
nedy's concurring opinion in Wisconsin Department of Corrections
v Schacht73 demonstrates the ease with which states may use the
Eleventh Amendment as a tool of strategic litigation. Justice
Kennedy calls for a modification in the Court's jurisprudence to
prevent the states from "gaining an unfair advantage."74 This
Part describes the "unfair advantage" enjoyed by states that
arises from the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurispru-
of the land, the State's courts are obliged to enforce it, even if it conflicts with state pol-
icy"). However, the Eleventh Amendment gives states immunity from suits in state court
arising under federal law enacted pursuant to Congress's Article I powers. Alden v Maine,
119 S Ct 2240, 2246 (1999).
' Exparte Young, 209 US at 157-60.
70 See, for example, Bacchus Imports, Ltd v Dias, 468 US 263 (1984); Thomas v Review
Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 US 707 (1981); Cohens v Virginia, 19
US (6 Wheat) 264, 383 (1821). For an excellent discussion of Supreme Court review of
state court decisions involving claims against the states, see Jackson, 98 Yale L J at 13-15,
14 n 59 (cited in note 8).
" Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution states: 'The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish" (emphasis added).
Employees, 411 US at 293-94. Elsewhere, the Supreme Court has stated: "That
States are not liable in [all] circumstances is a necessary consequence of their role in a
system of dual sovereignties. Although the dissent denies that sovereign immunity is 're-
quired by the structure of the federal system,' the principle has been deeply embedded in
our federal system from its inception." Welch, 483 US at 488 (citations omitted).
524 US 381, 118 S Ct 2047 (1998).
118 S Ct at 2055 (Kennedy concurring).
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dence and concludes that a modification in this jurisprudence
could remedy the unfair advantage conferred upon states and, ul-
timately, generate a better balance between state accountability
and state sovereignty than currently exists.
A. Wisconsin Department of Corrections v Schacht
In Schacht, the Supreme Court considered whether the pres-
ence of some claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment destroys
federal court jurisdiction in an otherwise removable case.
Schacht, a prison guard, filed a suit against the Wisconsin De-
partment of Corrections and several of its employees, in both
their "personal" and "official" capacity, alleging that his dismissal
violated the United States Constitution and federal civil rights
laws.75 The defendants removed the case to federal court and then
filed an answer asserting that the Eleventh Amendment barred
the claims against the Department and its employees in their of-
ficial capacities. The district court dismissed the claims against
the Department and its employees in their official capacities, and
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the
personal capacity claims.76 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit deter-
mined that removal had been improper because the presence of
even one claim subject to the Eleventh Amendment bar deprived
the federal courts of jurisdiction over the entire case.77 The Su-
preme Court reversed, concluding that
A State's proper assertion of an Eleventh Amendment bar af-
ter removal means that the federal court cannot hear the
barred claim. But that circumstance does not destroy re-
moval jurisdiction over the remaining [non-barred] claims in
the case before us. A federal court can proceed to hear those
other claims, and the District Court did not err in doing so.7"
Justice Kennedy joined in the Court's opinion, but noted that the
Court had "neither reached nor considered the argument that, by
giving its express consent to removal of the case from state court,
[the state] waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity."79
' Id at 2050 (majority opinion). The suit was brought under 42 USC § 1983, which is
the basic federal civil rights law. Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action against
those acting under color of state law who violate the Constitution or federal laws.
118 S Ct at 2050.
Schacht v Wisconsin Department of Corrections, 116 F3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir 1997).
Schacht, 118 S Ct at 2054.
Id at 2054 (Kennedy concurring).
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B. Justice Kennedy's Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennedy offered two arguments in support of the
proposition that removal should constitute consent to federal
court jurisdiction. First, he noted that because "[r]emoval re-
quires the consent of all of the defendants,""0 and because the
"law usually says a party must accept the consequences of its own
acts,"'81 consent to removal is, arguably, a constructive waiver of
Eleventh Amendment immunity. 2 Justice Kennedy buttressed
his argument by analogizing removal to other forms of state con-
duct held to constitute waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity,
such as a state's voluntary intervention in a federal court action
to assert its own claim. 3 Since a state is under no obligation to
remove a case and has the unilateral right to block such removal,
"any appearance the State makes in federal court may well be re-
garded as voluntary in the same manner as the appearances
which gave rise to the waivers" in voluntary intervention cases."
Justice Kennedy distinguished waiver based on removal from
other forms of state action deemed insufficient to constitute con-
sent to federal court jurisdiction. In both Atascadero and Edel-
man, the Supreme Court affirmed that a state's waiver of its
Eleventh Amendment immunity must be unequivocal and that
mere participation in a federal program through which the state
receives federal funds cannot establish consent to suit in federal
court.85 In recognition of these decisions, Justice Kennedy noted
that a state's consent based on removal amounts "to a direct invo-
cation of the jurisdiction of the federal courts, an act considerably
more specific than the general participation in a federal program
found insufficient in Atascadero and Edelman.""8
Justice Kennedy offered a second argument in support of the
proposition that removal by a state should constitute waiver of
Eleventh Amendment immunity. He noted that the Supreme
Court has held consistently that the Eleventh Amendment bar
may be asserted for the first time on appeal, so that a state does
"Id.
Id at 2055 (Kennedy concurring).
2Id.
"See Gunter v Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co, 200 US 273, 284 (1906) (holding that
"where a State voluntarily becomes a party to a cause and submits its rights for judicial
determination, it will be bound thereby and cannot escape the result of its own voluntary
act by invoking the prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment"); Clark v Barnard, 108 US
436, 447-48 (1883) (holding that a state's voluntary intervention in a federal court action
to assert its own claim constituted waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity).
"Schacht, 118 S Ct at 2056 (Kennedy concurring).
"See note 33 and accompanying text.
"Schacht, 118 S Ct at 2057 (Kennedy concurring).
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not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity simply by appearing
in federal court and defending on the merits. 7 Justice Kennedy
underscored the "unfairness" that arises from this holding:
In permitting the belated assertion of the Eleventh Amend-
ment bar, we allow States to proceed to judgment without
facing any real risk of adverse consequences. Should the
State prevail, the plaintiff would be bound by principles of
res judicata. If the State were to lose, however, it could void
the entire judgement simply by asserting its immunity on
appeal.88
Permitting states to raise Eleventh Amendment immunity for the
first time on appeal affords states an opportunity to await a deci-
sion on the merits before committing to the court's jurisdiction.
C. Why Remedy This "Unfair Advantage"
Permitting belated assertions of Eleventh Amendment im-
munity sanctions the practice of using Eleventh Amendment im-
munity as a tool of strategic litigation. As noted by Justice Ken-
nedy, a state may litigate the merits of a case in federal court
without waiving its Eleventh Amendment immunity.89 Further-
more, the Eleventh Amendment is not "jurisdictional in the sense
that it must be raised and decided by this Court on its own mo-
tion.""° Some lower federal courts have relied on these affirma-
tions to conclude that they are under no duty to address Eleventh
Amendment issues unless raised by the parties.9' Consequently,
' Id at 2055 (Kennedy concurring). In support of this point, see, for example, Florida
Department of State v Treasure Salvors, Inc, 458 US 670, 683 n 18 (1982) (plurality opin-
ion) ("The fact that the State appeared and offered defenses on the merits does not fore-
close consideration of the Eleventh Amendment issue."); Ford Motor Co v Department of
Transportation of Indiana, 323 US 459, 467 (1945) ("The Eleventh Amendment declares a
policy and sets forth an explicit limitation on federal judicial power of such compelling
force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment in this case
even though urged for the first time in this Court.").
Schacht, 118 S Ct at 2055 (Kennedy concurring).
Id (collecting cases).
Patsy v Board of Regents of Florida, 457 US 496, 515 n 19 (1982). See also Schacht,
118 S Ct at 2052 ("Nor need a court raise [an Eleventh Amendment] defect on its own.
Unless the State raises the matter, a court can ignore it."). This recent affirmation that
federal courts are under no duty to raise Eleventh Amendment immunity sua sponte is
significant, as some lower courts incorrectly interpreted the Supreme Courts decision in
Seminole Tribe as requiring sua sponte consideration of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
See Wilson-Jones v Caviness, 99 F3d 203, 206 (6th Cir 1996) (exercising sua sponte review
of the Eleventh Amendment issue and finding that Seminole Tribe abrogates footnote 19
in Patsy); In re Fennelly, 212 Bankr 61, 62 n 1 (D NJ 1997) (same).
" See, for example, Hoffman v Hunt, 126 F3d 575, 582 n 6 (4th Cir 1997) (relying on
Patsy to refuse to reach the Eleventh Amendment issue because it was not raised by the
parties); Mountain Water Co v Montana Department of Public Service Regulation, 919 F2d
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Eleventh Amendment immunity is often addressed for the first
time by appellate courts, and these courts frequently vacate the
decisions of lower federal courts because there was no jurisdiction
over the state.2 As a result, state accountability in federal courts
is diminished, as states can easily avoid compliance with unfa-
vorable judgments of federal courts, and private plaintiffs whose
resources are limited may be unable to relitigate a meritorious
claim in state court.
Essentially, permitting assertions of Eleventh Amendment
immunity for the first time on appeal enables a state defendant
to condition its grant of federal court jurisdiction over the state
on a favorable decision on the merits. Should a federal court ren-
der an unfavorable decision, the state may strip that court of its
jurisdiction by asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity on ap-
peal. Remedying this unfair advantage would restore the Elev-
enth Amendment to its proper role as a shield designed to protect
state sovereignty.93 At the same time, the remedy would ulti-
mately result in greater state accountability, as the merits of a
suit would be adjudicated in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Should the Supreme Court modify its jurisprudence to eliminate
belated assertions of Eleventh Amendment immunity, states
would no longer be able to invoke immunity as a tool of strategic
litigation, and the values of state sovereignty would be balanced
better with those of state accountability.
D. Eliminating Strategic Assertions of Eleventh
Amendment Immunity
To remedy the unfair advantage enjoyed by states under cur-
rent law, Justice Kennedy proposed that the Supreme Court treat
the Eleventh Amendment as it treats personal jurisdiction.94 Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court could adopt "a rule inferring waiver
from the failure to raise the objection at the outset of the pro-
ceedings," thereby preventing states from "gaining an unfair ad-
593, 596 n 1 (9th Cir 1990) (same); Roberts v College of the Desert, 870 F2d 1411, 1415 (9th
Cir 1988) (same); Jane L. v Bangerter, 794 F Supp 1528, 1531 (D Utah 1992) (same).
' See V-1 Oil Co v Utah State Department of Public Safety, 131 F3d 1415, 1419-22
(10th Cir 1997) (considering Eleventh Amendment immunity sua sponte and dismissing
two claims because jurisdiction over the state entities was found lacking); Suarez Corp In-
dustries v McGraw, 125 F3d 222, 227 (4th Cir 1997) (raising the issue sua sponte and re-
versing the denial of a motion to dismiss a claim that a state official violated state law);
Atlantic Healthcare Benefits Trust v Googins, 2 F3d 1, 4 (2d Cir 1993) (raising the issue
sua sponte and dismissing some claims for lack of jurisdiction).
See Part I.C.
Schacht, 118 S Ct at 2055 (Kennedy concurring).
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vantage."95 As Justice Kennedy noted, the rule inferring waiver
need not apply to cases originally filed in federal court where the
state appears and defends itself on the merits. 6 Rather, such
treatment of the Eleventh Amendment could be limited to those
cases in which a state, under no compulsion to appear in federal
court, voluntarily invokes a federal court's jurisdiction. Thus, in
removal cases, the Court would adopt "a rule of waiver in every
case where the State, through its attorneys, consents to removal
from the state court to the federal court."98 Justice Kennedy ar-
gued that "[i]f the States know or have reason to expect that re-
moval will constitute a waiver, then it is easy enough to presume
that an attorney authorized to represent the State can bind it to
the jurisdiction of the federal court (for Eleventh Amendment
purposes) by the consent to removal."99
Justice Kennedy's proposed solution suffers from two draw-
backs. First, his solution is overinclusive to the extent that it
would diminish the Eleventh Amendment protection afforded
states by expanding the waiver doctrine. The Supreme Court's ju-
risprudence wisely interprets states' waiver of sovereign immu-
nity narrowly, requiring an "unequivocal" indication of a state's
intent to subject itself to federal court jurisdiction. Under Justice
Kennedy's proposed solution, a state's waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity would be assumed from the act of re-
moval, thereby imputing to a state's attorney not only the
authority, but also the intent, to waive the state's sovereign im-
munity.
Second, Justice Kennedy's solution is underinclusive to the
extent that it fails to remedy the problem of strategic assertions
of Eleventh Amendment immunity that arises when a suit is
originally filed in federal court. In such a case, a state defendant
can still await a decision on the merits before committing to the
federal court's jurisdiction. Should the federal court issue an un-
favorable decision on the merits, the state can appeal the deci-
sion, assert Eleventh Amendment immunity for the first time,
and force the appellate court to vacate the decision for lack of ju-
risdiction.
Id.
Id.
Id at 2055-56 (Kennedy concurring).
Id at 2056-57 (Kennedy concurring).
Id at 2057 (Kennedy concurring).
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1. The threat to state sovereign immunity posed by Justice
Kennedy's solution.
Justice Kennedy's proposed solution would constrict the ef-
fectiveness of the Eleventh Amendment as a safeguard of state
sovereign immunity by expanding the scope of the waiver doc-
trine, contrary to the trend in the Supreme Court's Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence."°° The Court's "reluctance to infer
that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been
negated stems from recognition of the vital role of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity in our federal system.""' For good reason the
Supreme Court has held that it will not infer that a state has
consented to suit in federal court in the absence of an explicit
waiver."'
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence rightly recognizes that
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity is protected best by a
narrow application of the state waiver doctrine.0 3 Because such
immunity is "a guarantee that is implied as an essential compo-
nent of federalism," O4 the Court endeavors to safeguard it:
Constructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated
with the surrender of constitutional rights, and we see no
place for it here. In deciding whether a State has waived its
constitutional protection under the Eleventh Amendment,
we will find waiver only where stated "by the most express
language or by such overwhelming implications from the text
as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construc-
tion."105
By expanding the state waiver doctrine, Justice Kennedy's solu-
tion inadequately safeguards state sovereignty. It creates a de-
fault rule under which federal courts may infer waiver of Elev-
enth Amendment immunity unless a state affirmatively objects to
federal court jurisdiction. Such a rule forces states to explicitly
withhold, rather than explicitly grant, consent to suit in federal
court. The default rule in effect would shift from one that pre-
serves states' constitutional right of sovereign immunity to one
"See id ("It is true as well that the Courts recent cases have disfavored constructive
waivers of the Eleventh Amendment and have required the State's consent to suit be une-
quivocal.").
"' Pennhurst State School and Hospital v Halderman, 465 US 89, 99 (1984).
"See Part I.A.
"See text accompanying notes 30-37.
"'Nevada v Hall, 440 US 410, 430 (1979) (Blackmun dissenting).
"°Edelman, 415 US at 673, quoting Murray v Wilson Distilling Company, 213 US 151,
171 (1909). See also Atascadero, 473 US at 238 n 1.
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that assumes forfeiture of that right from the act of removal
alone.
Justice Kennedy argues, however, that removal by a state is
sufficiently akin to an explicit grant of consent to federal court ju-
risdiction such that removal should constitute waiver of sovereign
immunity." He relies on the proposition that "where a State vol-
untarily become [sic] a party to a cause and submits its rights for
judicial determination, it will be bound thereby and cannot es-
cape the result of its own voluntary act by invoking the prohibi-
tions of the Eleventh Amendment.""7 It is true that the Supreme
Court has held that a state's voluntary intervention in a federal
court action to assert its own claim is sufficient to constitute
waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity."°8 Such an inference of
waiver involves "an application of the well-accepted principle that
when a sovereign sues for affirmative relief, it is deemed to have
waived its sovereign immunity as to the issues presented by its
affirmative claim.""0 9 Yet when a state defendant removes a suit
to federal court, the state is not asserting an affirmative claim.
Rather the state simply is exercising its right as a defendant to
choose the forum in which to litigate claims asserted against it.
The distinction between asserting one's own claim as opposed
to defending oneself against a claim is a distinction worth pre-
serving when deciding the scope of the waiver doctrine. The dis-
tinction preserves a state's right as a defendant to invoke federal
court jurisdiction over some claims asserted against it while as-
serting sovereign immunity with respect to other claims. In
Schacht, the Supreme Court noted the very reason why removal
by a state defendant differs from a state's voluntary intervention
in a federal court case:
[Where original jurisdiction rests upon the Statute's grant
of "arising under" jurisdiction, the Court has assumed that
the presence of a potential Eleventh Amendment bar with
respect to one claim, has not destroyed original jurisdiction
over the case .... A State's proper assertion of an Eleventh
Amendment bar after removal means that the federal court
cannot hear the barred claim. But that circumstance does
not destroy removal jurisdiction over the remaining claims in
' Schacht, 118 S Ct at 2057 (Kennedy concurring).
"Id at 2055-56 (Kennedy concurring), quoting Gunter v Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Co, 200 US at 284.
" Clark v Barnard, 108 US at 436.
'"Ford Motor Co, 323 US at 467 n 12.
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the case .... A federal court can proceed to hear those other
claims."0
Accordingly, a state may remove an entire case to federal court
and assert Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to some
claims while invoking federal court jurisdiction over others.
Treating removal like voluntary intervention would deprive state
defendants of the right to invoke federal court jurisdiction over
some claims while asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity
with respect to others because removal alone would constitute
waiver of sovereign immunity.
Justice Kennedy's proposal suffers from an additional prob-
lem, as its adoption would entail rejecting the Supreme Court's
position that only the state, acting through procedural mecha-
nisms designed to ensure political accountability, can waive Elev-
enth Amendment immunity."' The Court has held that state offi-
cials can waive Eleventh Amendment immunity only if explicitly
authorized to do so by the state's constitution or laws."' Thus,
under the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, removal
will constitute waiver only if the official representing the state is
granted the explicit authority to waive the state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity."' The general authority to represent a
state in an action brought against it is not coextensive with the
authority to waive the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity."4
Under Justice Kennedy's proposal a state's attorney 'could
unilaterally waive a state's sovereign immunity from suit in fed-
eral court, even absent explicit authorization from the state it-
self.' He suggests that "[i]f the States know or have reason to
"Schacht, 118 S Ct at 2053-54.
'" See, for example, Atascadero, 473 US at 241 (collecting cases); Ford Motor Co, 323
US at 467.
"' See Ford Motor Co, 323 US at 467-70.
"'See id at 466-70. See also Estate of Porter v Illinois, 36 F3d 684, 690 (7th Cir 1994)
(holding that "state officials can only waive a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity if
they are specifically authorized to do so by the state's constitution, statutes, or decisions");
Silver v Baggiano, 804 F2d 1211, 1214 (11th Cir 1986) (holding that "removal by state of-
ficials of a suit ... to federal court does not amount to waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity unless those state officials are authorized to waive such immunity").
"' See Ford Motor Co, 323 US at 468 C(Nor do we think that any of the general or spe-
cial powers conferred by statute on the Indiana attorney general to appear and defend ac-
tions brought against the state or its officials can be deemed to confer on that officer power
to consent to suit against the state in [federal] courts when the state has not consented to
be sued."). Various lower federal court decisions have held similarly that a state attorney
general cannot waive state sovereign immunity absent explicit authorization. See, for ex-
ample, Estate of Porter, 36 F3d at 690-91; Silver, 804 F2d at 1214-15; Deseret Water, Oil &
Irrigation Co v California, 202 F 498, 500 (9th Cir 1913).
"'Schacht, 118 S Ct at 2056-57 (Kennedy concurring) ("[Tihe absence of specific
authorization, it seems to me, is not an insuperable obstacle to adopting a rule of waiver
1280 [66:1261
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expect that removal will constitute waiver, then it is easy enough
to presume that an attorney authorized to represent the State
can bind it to the jurisdiction of the federal court ... by the con-
sent to removal.""1 6 But a rule that treats a decision by a state's
attorney as equivalent to a decision by the state would confer
upon state representatives sovereign powers that only a state (as
embodied in its legislature or governor) possesses. Because Jus-
tice Kennedy's proposal would transfer sovereign powers to rep-
resentatives who are not held politically accountable for their de-
cisions, his solution would undermine the principles of federalism
and improperly expand the waiver doctrine.
2. Justice Kennedy's solution would not prevent states from
using sovereign immunity strategically.
While Justice Kennedy limits his argument to cases where a
state removes a suit to federal court, the strategic use of sover-
eign immunity is not confined to the removal context. Under-
standably, Justice Kennedy's concurrence focuses on suits origi-
nally filed in state court and subsequently removed by a state de-
fendant to federal court, because those were the facts in Schacht.
Nevertheless, a state similarly may benefit from belated asser-
tions of sovereign immunity when defending itself against a claim
originally filed in federal court." ' In such cases, the state may re-
frain from asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity until the
court renders its decision on the merits. If the state prevails, it
can take advantage of the claim preclusive effect of its victory.
However, should the court render a judgment against the state,
the state may assert its immunity for the first time on appeal,
causing the case to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction." 8 The
state thus benefits from the same legal maneuvering irrespective
of which party to the suit invoked federal court jurisdiction.
Unlike a state, most private litigants do not have virtually
unlimited resources with which to litigate claims. Accordingly, a
in every case where the State, through its attorneys, consents to removal from the state
court to the federal court.").
"'Id at 2057 (Kennedy concurring).
"'See, for example, Dagnall v Gegenheimer, 631 F2d 1195, 1196 (5th Cir 1980) (The
State has asserted its immunity only after it sought a favorable verdict and lost before the
jury. Had it prevailed, Louisiana would doubtless be claiming the case was tried with its
consent. That today's decision might permit such an inequity cannot overcome Louisiana's
plain constitutional right and clear statutory provision.").
"'See, for example, Garcia v Board of Education of the Socorro Consolidated School
District, 777 F2d 1403, 1405-07 (10th Cir 1985) (vacating a jury verdict in favor of the
plaintiff after a state entity raised Eleventh Amendment immunity for the first time on
appeal).
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private litigant may be unable to relitigate a meritorious claim in
state court should an appellate federal court vacate a favorable
judgment due to a state's assertion of Eleventh Amendment im-
munity. Although the "unfairness" of raising Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity for the first time on appeal seems exacerbated in
the removal context, the same unfairness nonetheless exists
when a suit is originally filed in federal court and the state
awaits a decision on the merits before asserting sovereign immu-
nity. An appropriate solution to the problem of belated assertions
of Eleventh Amendment immunity would eliminate the ability of
state defendants to behave strategically regardless of how the
state finds itself in federal court.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION: REQUIRING FEDERAL COURTS
TO CONSIDER ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY SUA SPONTE
This Part proposes a solution to the problem of strategic as-
sertions of sovereign immunity that better safeguards state sov-
ereignty than the solution proposed by Justice Kennedy. The Su-
preme Court often treats Eleventh Amendment immunity as a
restriction on federal court jurisdiction. However, this treatment
is incomplete in that federal courts need not consider the issue of
Eleventh Amendment immunity sua sponte."9 While the Su-
preme Court has never committed to a single interpretation of
the Eleventh Amendment-in some cases viewing it as an em-
bodiment of sovereign immunity12 and in others viewing it as a
restriction on federal court subject matter jurisdiction 2 1-the
Court invariably acknowledges that the Eleventh Amendment
explicitly limits the reach of federal jurisdiction.
As a jurisdictional issue, Eleventh Amendment immunity
should be resolved sua sponte at the outset of litigation. Indeed,
this is the approach many lower courts already take. 2 A rule
that required federal courts to consider the issue of Eleventh
Amendment immunity sua sponte would resolve all questions of
federal court jurisdiction before the court addressed the merits of
'..Currently, federal courts are permitted, but not required, to consider Eleventh
Amendment immunity sua sponte. See note 90 and accompanying text.
See Part IA.
2See Part III.B.
"See, for example, Vinson v Clarke County, 10 F Supp 2d 1282, 1298 n 14 (S D Ala
1998); New England Multi-Unit Housing Laundry Association v Rhode Island Housing
and Mortgage Finance Corp, 893 F Supp 1180, 1187 (D RI 1995); Wilkins v Ohio, 885 F
Supp 1055, 1066-67 (S D Ohio 1995); Vickery v Jones, 856 F Supp 1313, 1327 (S D Ill
1994); Anheuser-Busch, Inc v Goodman, 724 F Supp 345, 346 (M D Pa 1989); Shipley v
First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Delaware, 619 F Supp 421, 434-35 (D Del
1985); In re Fennelly, 212 Bankr 61, 62 (D NJ 1997).
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a claim. Under such a rule, whenever a state or state entity ap-
peared before a federal court, the court would, as a preliminary
matter, ask the parties to brief the issue of Eleventh Amendment
immunity. 23 The court would then undertake an independent de-
termination of its own jurisdiction, assessing the presence or ab-
sence of waiver based on the requirements already established by
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, such as whether the state
legislature authorized federal court jurisdiction in a given case.
Consequently, adopting a mandatory sua sponte rule would rem-
edy the problems associated with belated assertions of state im-
munity without disrupting the Supreme Court's effort to safe-
guard state sovereignty.
124
A. The Judicial Power to Consider Arguments Not Raised by
the Parties
"When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the
court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by
the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify
and apply the proper construction of governing law."'25 Never-
theless, a rule mandating sua sponte consideration of Eleventh
Amendment immunity is an exceptional remedy for the problem
arising from belated assertions of Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity. For good reason, federal courts typically refrain from con-
sidering issues not raised by the litigants. As Justice Scalia has
noted, "the refusal to consider arguments not raised is a sound
prudential practice."
12
Under limited circumstances, however, a court will exercise
its power to consider issues not raised by the parties.2 ' The least
'" A rule mandating sua sponte consideration of sovereign immunity would not elimi-
nate all cases in which Eleventh Amendment immunity is asserted for the first time on
appeal. There may still be cases in which a defendant is not identified as a state entity at
the onset of litigation, and thus, a federal district court may not realize that the suit im-
plicates Eleventh Amendment immunity. Nevertheless, a rule mandating sua sponte con-
sideration of Eleventh Amendment immunity at the outset of litigation would largely
eliminate those instances in which sovereign immunity is asserted for the first time on
appeal.
"It is important to note that in Schacht, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position
that federal courts are not required to consider Eleventh Amendment immunity sua
sponte. Schacht, 118 S Ct at 2052-53. Nevertheless, this statement is not essential to the
Courts holding in Schacht. Furthermore, as this Comment suggests, abandoning this po-
sition in order to remedy the problems associated with belated assertions of Eleventh
Amendment immunity would disrupt less of the Supreme Courts Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence than the alternative solution proposed by Justice Kennedy. See Part HI.D.1.
"nKamen v Kemper Financial Services, Inc, 500 US 90, 99 (1991).
' United States v Davis, 512 US 452, 464 (1994) (Scalia concurring).
See Eric D. Miller, Comment, Should Courts Consider 18 USC § 3501 Sua Sponte?,
65 U Chi L Rev 1029, 1039-51 (1998) (examining the main contexts in which courts con-
The University of Chicago Law Review
controversial occasion for sua sponte consideration of legal issues
arises when federal courts review subject matter jurisdiction.
Federal courts have an obligation to raise jurisdictional defects
sua sponte. 12' This duty arises from the constitutional limitations
placed on federal court jurisdiction. Because Article III delineates
the cases over which federal jurisdiction extends, 129 federal courts
necessarily are courts of limited jurisdiction. 3 ' The parties cannot
expand the limited federal judicial power by consenting to a ju-
risdiction that has not been granted. 3' Accordingly, federal courts
will address jurisdictional defects even if the litigants fail to raise
the issue.
B. The Eleventh Amendment as a Jurisdictional Issue: Why
Sua Sponte Consideration Should Be Mandatory
In light of the federal courts' treatment of subject matter ju-
risdiction, sua sponte review of Eleventh Amendment immunity
seems less extraordinary. Eleventh Amendment immunity is of-
ten treated as a restriction on federal court subject matter juris-
diction, barring federal courts from hearing suits against state
governments. 132 The text of the Eleventh Amendment supports
this view, as the initial language of the Amendment appears to
sider legal issues sua sponte).
" See Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v Doyle, 429 US 274, 278
(1977) (noting that "we are obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to the
existence of federal jurisdiction"). See also Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan Rail-
way Co v Swan, 111 US 379, 382 (1884) (noting the existence of an "inflexible" rule that
"without exception" requires the Court, on its own motion, to determine if jurisdiction is
lacking).
'"Article III, § 2, cl 1 states: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassa-
dors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Juris-
diction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies
between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;--between
citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereo; and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects."
"0The Supreme Court has noted, "Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The
character of the controversies over which federal judicial authority may extend are deline-
ated in Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is further limited to those
subjects encompassed within a statutory grant of jurisdiction." Insurance Corp of Ireland,
Ltd v Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 US 694, 701-02 (1982).
"' The Supreme Court has held that "no action of [litigants] can confer subject-matter
jurisdiction upon a federal court. Thus, the consent of the parties is irrelevant." Id at 702.
"See, for example, Pennhurst State School and Hospital v Halderman, 465 US 89, 98
(1984) (holding that "the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on
the federal judicial power established in Art. III"). See also Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 68
(quoting Pennhurst).
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express a constitutional limitation on federal subject matter ju-
risdiction: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend... "133 The Supreme Court has declared that
the Eleventh Amendment "affirm[s] that the fundamental princi-
ple of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in
Art. III."' This interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment as a
bar to federal jurisdiction was recently reaffirmed in Seminole
Tribe, where the Supreme Court held that "the Eleventh
Amendment [stands] for the constitutional principle that state
sovereign immunity [limits] the federal courts' jurisdiction under
Article III.'l"5
Because Eleventh Amendment immunity is treated as a ju-
risdictional issue, sua sponte consideration of this immunity
should be mandatory. It is well-established that "[j]urisdiction is
power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only
function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and
dismissing the cause.""'6 Consequently, federal courts are re-
quired to raise objections to subject matter jurisdiction on their
own when defects in jurisdiction become apparent. 37 Eleventh
Amendment immunity warrants the same treatment as subject
matter jurisdiction. Moreover, because Article III's "case or con-
troversy" requirement counsels against the issuance of decisions
that are unlikely to bring about some change or have some ef-
fect," federal courts should be required to resolve any Eleventh
Amendment issue before rendering a decision on the merits that
is easily vacated on appeal.1 39
Several advantages flow from requiring federal courts to con-
sider Eleventh Amendment immunity sua sponte, in addition to
eliminating the problems that arise from strategic assertions of
immunity. First, since litigants would brief the issue of Eleventh
Amendment immunity, they would be provided with the opportu-
"=US Const, Amend XL.
Pennhurst, 465 US at 98.
' 517 US at 64-65.
'SExparts McCardle, 74 US (7 Wall) 506, 514 (1868).
""See note 127.
"See Hayburn's Case, 2 US (2 Dall) 409 (1792) (recognizing the prohibition on giving
advisory opinions). See also C & S Air Lines, Inc v Waterman Steamship Corp, 333 US
103, 113 (1948) (holding that "b]udgments within the powers vested in courts by [Article
1I] may not lawfully be revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by another De-
partment of Government").
"For an excellent discussion of the Supreme Courts jurisprudence that counsels
against the issuance of opinions by federal courts that are unlikely to bring about change
or that are subject to being revised, see James S. Liebman and William F. Ryan, "Some Ef-
fectual Power" The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article LI Courts,
98 Colum L Rev 696, 783-810 (1998).
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nity to ensure that the court adequately understood sovereign
immunity law as applied to the facts of the case before rendering
a decision. Second, a rule mandating sua sponte consideration of
Eleventh Amendment immunity actually would conserve judicial
resources. Rather than force courts and litigants to expend the
resources necessary to adjudicate the merits of a claim simply to
have the decision vacated on appeal, sua sponte consideration of
Eleventh Amendment immunity would enable a federal court to
decide at the outset whether it has jurisdiction before reaching
the merits. Finally, because sua sponte consideration of Eleventh
Amendment immunity would prevent federal courts from sitting
in judgment of states when jurisdiction is lacking, such a rule ex-
hibits judicial restraint.
C. Implementing a Sua Sponte Rule
Under a rule that required federal courts to consider the is-
sue of Eleventh Amendment immunity sua sponte, courts would
resolve jurisdictional questions before addressing the merits of a
claim. When a state or state entity appeared before a federal
court, the court would ask the parties to brief the issue of Elev-
enth Amendment immunity. The court would subsequently un-
dertake an independent determination of its own jurisdiction, as-
sessing the presence or absence of waiver based on the require-
ments established by Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. Con-
sequently, adopting a mandatory sua sponte rule would largely
eliminate the problems associated with belated assertions of state
immunity without disrupting the Supreme Court's effort to safe-
guard state sovereignty.
A sua sponte rule admittedly introduces new problems to the
practice of verifying subject matter jurisdiction. Typically, when
federal courts raise jurisdictional defects on their own, they are
required to interpret federal law only. For example, when federal
courts confirm basic jurisdictional elements, they look to the con-
gressional statutes that establish whether a suit arises under the
courts' federal question or diversity jurisdiction. Similarly, when
federal courts determine whether a particular case comports with
the requirements of Article III jurisdiction, federal courts look to
federal precedent, which delineates the bounds of the "case or
controversy" requirement.
In contrast, a court considering Eleventh Amendment im-
munity may be required to interpret state law to determine
whether a state's constitution or statutes permit waiver of state
immunity in the case at hand. This is because the Supreme
Court's treatment of Eleventh Amendment immunity differs from
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the Court's treatment of subject matter jurisdiction in one impor-
tant respect: while a state may waive its Eleventh Amendment
immunity and consent to suit in federal court,40 "no action of [the
litigants] can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal
court. Thus the consent of the parties is irrelevant."' Thus,
while the Court treats Article III as an absolute limitation on
federal courts' jurisdiction, the Court treats the Eleventh
Amendment as a "personal privilege which [a state] may waive at
pleasure."' Accordingly, when addressing the issue of Eleventh
Amendment immunity, a court must determine whether a state's
immunity has been waived, a determination that involves the in-
terpretation of state law.
Traditionally, federal courts have preferred to leave the in-
terpretation of state law to state courts. Nevertheless, in suits in-
volving questions of Eleventh Amendment immunity, such re-
straint is unwarranted. The Supreme Court has held that
"[a]lthough a State's general waiver of sovereign immunity may
subject it to suit in state court, it is not enough to waive the im-
munity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment."'' Rather, for a
state statute or constitutional provision to constitute a waiver of
Eleventh Amendment immunity, "it must specify the State's in-
tention to subject itself to suit in federal court."'" Thus, the Court
distinguishes between state laws that waive immunity from suit
in state court and those that waive immunity from suit in federal
court. Only those statutes that address immunity from suit in
federal court are relevant to the resolution of Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity. As the Eleventh Amendment holds no relevance
to state court jurisdiction, only federal courts will have occasion
to address whether a particular state law authorizes waiver of
state immunity from suit in federal court. Federal courts are thus
the appropriate institutions to interpret state statutes and consti-
tutional provisions directed. at state immunity from federal court
jurisdiction.
Because a determination of Eleventh Amendment immunity
will often require federal courts to interpret state law, such a rule
might appear to be burdensome to the courts. In reality, the bur-
den would fall only on the parties. Federal courts that initially
raised Eleventh Amendment immunity sua sponte would subse-
"See Pennhurst, 465 US at 99; Hans, 134 US at 20 (noting that a state is immune
from suit in federal court "unless the State consents to be sued").
"Insurance Corp of Ireland, 456 US at 702.
" Clark v Barnard, 108 US 436, 447 (1883).
"'Atascadero, 473 US at 241.
'"Id.
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quently require the parties to brief the issue. The parties would
thus identify the relevant state law, and the court would perform
its appropriate role of interpreting that law. The fact that many
district courts already raise Eleventh Amendment immunity sua
sponte" I dispels the concern that such a practice is unduly bur-
densome to federal courts. Yet because other federal courts rely
on the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, which permits federal
courts to rule on the merits of a suit without first resolving poten-
tial Eleventh Amendment objections to the courts' jurisdiction," 6
Eleventh Amendment immunity is often raised for the first time
on appeal.'47 A rule that would require federal courts to consider
Eleventh Amendment immunity on its own motion would elimi-
nate many belated assertions of Eleventh Amendment immunity,
conserve limited judicial resources, and restore sovereign immu-
nity to its proper role as a safeguard of state sovereignty.
CONCLUSION
Allowing a state to raise Eleventh Amendment immunity af-
ter a lower federal court has rendered a judgment on the merits
gives the state an unfair advantage in litigation. If the state wins
in the district court without making an Eleventh Amendment
objection, it can exploit the preclusive effect of a favorable judg-
ment on the merits. If the state loses, it can raise the Eleventh
Amendment issue on appeal and have the judgment vacated.
Federal courts should be required to raise Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity sua sponte before addressing the merits of a case.
Absent an "unequivocal indication" that the state consents to suit
in federal court, the federal court lacks jurisdiction over the case.
The state may exercise its sovereign power and consent to suit in
federal court, so long as its waiver comports with the standards
established by the Supreme Court. Because the sua sponte rule
would require federal courts to address the issue of Eleventh
Amendment immunity at the outset of a case, the rule would pre-
vent states from asserting immunity for the first time on appeal.
Consequently, states would no longer be able to use sovereign
immunity as a tool of strategic litigation, and the Supreme
Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence would better balance
the competing values of state accountability and state sover-
eignty than the current regime.
" See note 122 and accompanying text.
" See note 91 and accompanying text.
"'See note 92 and accompanying text.
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